To be able to generalize or draw meaningful conclusions, he said, we need an accurate and descriptive database. Finally, during its "regrouping" phase begun in late 2004, Al Qaeda has shifted to revenues from drug trafficking and barter.īiersteker spoke at length on the methodology of tracking and coding terrorist attacks and operations. After the fall of the Taliban following 9/11 it moved more in the direction of petty crime and fraud. During the 1990s, under the Taliban, it shifted more towards business fronts and smuggling. In the first, during the mujahideen period of the 1980s in Afghanistan, it relied heavily on money channeled through charities. By utilizing so many, it diversifies its sources, introduces redundancies into the operation and minimizes chances of detection.īecause of the many covert or nontraditional ways of moving money, Biersteker cautioned against over-regulation although terrorists do use banks and other established financial resources, he felt the costs of over-regulation could outweigh the benefits.Īl Qaeda's mode of financing has passed through four distinct phases. As with its fundraising, Al Qaeda relies on a multitude of strategies to move its assets. Tactics include using traditional banks (both in target countries and in offshore locations), money transfers through legitimate organizations or hawalas, commodities such as diamonds, cash, and trade diversion, or smuggling. There are nearly as many methods of moving the funds once raised, Biersteker said. And for groups such as FARC in Colombia or the LTTE in Sri Lanka, kidnapping and extortion may also play a role. Biersteker pointed out that contrary to popular belief, Osama bin Laden's personal wealth is not considered a significant source of Al Qaeda's income. Funneling money through legitimate business fronts, petty or organized crime, credit card fraud, hawala money couriers and charitable front organizations are all major revenue sources, in particular for Al Qaeda. The ways that terrorists fund their operations are as varied as the terror organizations themselves. Nor is there always a direct correlation between operational cost and lethality. Even if operational costs are a tenth of the total cost, as Biersteker estimated, the financial barriers to terrorism are not high. In contrast, the Bali bombings cost $20-35,000, the Madrid train bombings $50,000 and the 7/7 attacks on London a mere $15,000. The entire operational cost of 9/11 is thought to have been about $500,000, of which three-fifths moved through U.S. So what do we know? A common consensus is that however terrorists raise the money, it doesn't take much to plan, organize and carry out the attacks. And yet, noted Professor Thomas Biersteker, our knowledge on the subject is still very limited. In the aftermath of 9/11 there have been a multitude of books published on the subject of financing and funding terrorism. This meeting, part of the ongoing Terrorism and Homeland Security Forum series, was co-sponsored by the Council on Global Terrorism, Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies, and the Woodrow Wilson Center's Division of International Security Studies. Careers, Fellowships, and Internships Open/Close.Science and Technology Innovation Program.The Middle East and North Africa Workforce Development Initiative.Kissinger Institute on China and the United States.Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.North Korea International Documentation Project.Environmental Change and Security Program.Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy.
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